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FLIGHT INVESTIGATION OF THE LANDING TASK IN A JET TRAINER 
WITH RESTRICTED FIELDS OF VIEW 
By John J. Perry,  William H. Dana, and Donald C. Bacon, Jr. 
NASA Flight Research Center 
SUMMARY 
A total of 155 landings were made in a T-33A jet aircraft in order to determine the 
relationship between the pilot's field of view and his performance of the landing 
maneuver. 
an (5.7") horizontal and 0.52 radian (30") vertical. The pilot's task was to fly a 180" 
power-on pattern and final approach and land the aircraft on a predetermined point on 
the runway. Also, power-off 360' overhead and straight-in approaches were performed 
by one of the pilots. The quality of the performance of the power-on task was  measured 
by recording touchdown er ror .  Pilot comments were obtained for all flights. 
The field of view was reduced from unrestricted to a minimum of 0.10 radi- 
Performance of the power-on landing task, as measured by touchdown er ror ,  was 
not appreciably affected by the reduction of the field of view. However, pilot comments 
indicate that even the smallest restrictions of the field of view adversely affected the 
performance of the task. 
INTRODUCTION 
A flight program was conducted at the NASA Flight Research Center to gather data 
on the effects of field of view on the pilot's ability to perform the landing maneuver. A 
single restricted field of view had been evaluated in flight previously as part of the 
study of reference 1, In that investigation, the task was to land a transport aircraft from 
a straight-in approach with the runway almost always in the field of view. 
indicated no significant degradation of performance as a result of the restricted field of 
view. 
The results 
In the Flight Research Center investigation, a 180" pattern was chosen so that the 
effects of field of view on pattern control, as well as on approach and landing, could be 
investigated. A series of power-on landings was made in a T-33A jet trainer with the 
canopy masked in varying degrees. Touchdown er ror  was used to measure the quality 
of the pilots' performance of the landing maneuver, and pilot comments on the total 
task were  recorded. In addition, 360" overhead and straight-in approaches were  
performed with power off and were  evaluated qualitatively. The results of all the 
landings made by four research pilots during the investigation are summarized in this 
paper. 
SYMBOLS 
The units used for the physical quantities in this paper are given, where applicable, 
Factors relat- in both the International System of Units (SI) and U. S. Customary Units. 
ing the two systems are presented in reference 2. 
H hypothesis 
n number of trials 
S standard deviation 
statistical-table variable, where 01 = copfidence level and d = degrees of 
freedom 
ta/2;d 
X touchdown e r ro r  (+ denotes long, - denotes short of desired touchdown point), 
meters (feet) 
- 
X average touchdown er ror ,  meters (feet) 
- 
IX I average of the absolute values of touchdown er ror ,  meters (feet) 
I-1 hypothesis test parameter 
Subscripts : 
i, j , k integral indices 
EQUIPMENT 
A T-33A jet aircraft (fig. 1) 
was used as the test vehicle for 
this program. The aircraft was  
flown with tip tanks installed. 
The weight at touchdown varied 
between 6130 kilograms 
(13,500 pounds) and 4540 kilo- 
grams (10,000 pounds). The 
indicated airspeed at touchdown 
varied between 57 meters per 
second (110 knots) and 49 meters 
per second (95 knots). Figure 1.- Test vehicle (T-33A jet trainer). 
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The asphalt runway used was  1800 meters (6000 feet) long with markers on both 
sides at 300-meter (1000-foot) intervals (figs. 2(a) and 2@)). The predetermined touch- 
down point was  the marker nearest the runway threshold. 
(a) Aerial photo of area in vicinity of runway. 
(b) Sketch of runway and desired touchdown point (*). Dimensions in meters (feet). 
Figure 2.- Ground features of pattern area and runway. 
The field of view was restricted by using amber cellulose acetate to partially 
cover the inside of the canopy and windshield (figs. 3(a) to 3(g)) and by requiring the 
subject pilot to wear a blue visor. This particular blue-amber combination produced 
(a) Closeup side view of T-33A showing cockpit masking and subject pilot. 
Figure 3.- Tes t  configuration. 
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(b) Field of view A. (c) Field of view B. 
(d) Field of view C. (e )  Field of view D.  
(f) Field of view E. 
Figure 3.- Concluded. 
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(g) Field of view F. 
.- 
a near-perfect mask. This technique was used instead of a single opaque mask in order 
to provide vision for the safety pilot in the rear  cockpit while masking the subject pilot's 
view. The dimensions of the restricted fields of view, A to F, are  presented in table I. 
TABLE I. - DIMENSIONS FOR EACH RESTRICTED 
FIELD O F  VIEW INVESTIGATED 
Field 
view 
k 
I C  
Horizontal  
dimensions,  
r ad ians  (degrees)  
2.44 (140) 
1.69 (97) 
1.17 (67) 
. 6 3  (36) 
. 3 2  (18.3) 
.10 (5.7) 
Ver t ica l  
dimensions,  
radians (degrees)  
I 
. 5 2  (30) I 
.52  (30) I 
. 5 2  (30) 1 
I 
TESTS AND PROCEDURES 
Four experienced research pilots performed landings at unrestricted and six differ- 
ent restricted fields of view. A total of 155 landings were performed. The sequence of 
flights for each pilot is shown in table II. All  flights except one were made under 
visual-flight conditions with a surface wind velocity less than 5 meters per second 
(10 knots); during one flight, the wind velocity increased to 9 meters per second 
(18 knots). 
TABLE 11. - SEQUENCE O F  RESTRICTED AND 
UNRESTRICTED FIELDS O F  VIEW EVALUATED 
BY EACH SUBJECT PILOT 
Flight P i lo t  1 P i lo t  2 
2 A B 
3 B C 
I I I 8 I 2U(2) I ---- 
B I B  I 
I I 
U(l) denotes ini t ia l  f l ight with u n r e s t r i c t e d  
U(2) denotes final flight with u n r e s t r i c t e d  
field of view. 
field of view. 
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The safety pilot set up the following conditions at the start of each pattern: 
3000 meters (10,000 feet) abeam and 500 meters (1500 feet) above the desired touchdown 
point, on the downwind leg of the pattern, at an airspeed of 72 meters per second 
(140 knots). On the early flights, in addition to this task and his safety role, the safety 
pilot also recorded airspeed at touchdown and estimated touchdown error .  
At the desired pattern-initiation point (fig. 4(a)), with airspeed, trim, and aircraft 
configuration set, the subject pilot was given control of the aircraft. He was in com- 
plete control for the remainder of the flight, which included downwind leg, 180" final 
turn, final approach, landing, and takeoff. At  each field of view, the pilot flew three 
power-on approaches and landings for practice and five to obtain data. The first and 
last, or next to last, flights by each pilot were  performed with an unrestricted field of 
view. 
Top view 
Pattern-initiation point 
500 meters (1500 feet) 
above fie1 elevation  3000 b e t e r s  
(IO, 000 feet) 
I 
Touchdown ,1= +,lare 
4.5 kilometers 
(2.5 nautical miles) 
Pattern-initiation ~. 
Side view point 
(a) 180° approach. 
Figure 4.- Illustration of approaches. 
In addition to the power-on approaches performed for data, one pilot performed 
power-off, 360' overhead and straight-in approaches at several fields of view (figs. 4(b) 
and 4(c)). Pattern control within an area with which the pilot was familiar was evalu- 
ated qualitatively by the pilot at each field of view. 
Touchdown errors  were measured by ground observers to within 1.5 meters (5 feet) 
of the actual touchdown point by reference to a particular quarter of the 6-meter 
(20-foot) runway centerline segments. 
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Touchdown7 
High-key position 
(6000 feet) above 
Low-key position, 
one-half high-key 
Side view 
(b) 3600 overhead approach. 
Touchdown Flare 
TOP view 4 X 
High-key position 
3000 meters 
(10,000 feet) above 
field elevation 
Glide slope modulated with 
landing flaps and sideslip 
when pilot is assured of 
sufficient energy 
Side view - 22 kilometers I- (12 nautical miles) 
(c) Straight-in approach. 
Figure 4.- Concluded. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The landing task was  evaluated through the use of observec toucLLdown e r ro r  data 
and comments from the subject pilots. Touchdown e r ro r  data from the landings, which 
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were performed from a 180' power-on approach, are presented in table 111 and figure 5. 
All the pilots commented on these landings, and one pilot commented on landings made 
from 360' and straight-in power-off approaches (figs. 4@) and 4(c)). 
+9 (+31) 
-18 (-58) 
-20 (-66) 
-54 (-178) 
-28 (-93) 
-48 (-158) 
-10 (-34) 
-21 (-70) 
-4 (-13) 
-5 (-18) 
-33 (-108) 
+I (+2) 
-30 (-97) 
-52 (-171) 
+13 (+42) 
There are  two sets of data points for which unforeseen influences might have 
increased the error .  The first of these is the flight at field of view D for pilot 3. The 
pilot elected to complete this flight even though a crosswind developed that was greater 
(9 meters per second (18 knots)) than the experiment limit (5 meters per second 
(10 knots)). Secondly, the touchdown e r ro r  data for the flight at field of view U(l) for 
pilot 1 were estimated by the safety pilot. A check of the previous estimates by this 
safety pilot showed that he was within 2.75 meters (9 feet) of the average values cal- 
culated from ground-observer records. 
+13 (+42) 
-17 (-56) 
-11 (-37) 
-33 (-108) 
1 2  (+8) 
-9 (-31) 
-48 (-158) 
-11 (-36) 
-41 (-134) 
-13 (-42) 
+7 (+23) 
-33 (-108) 
-6 (-19) 
-28 (-92) 
+8 (+27) 
It is recognized that the T-33 airplane has very satisfactory landing characteristics 
that enable approaches to be made from shallow angles even with power off. The ability 
to perform landings at restricted fields of view may change if an aircraft with different 
landing characteristics is used or  i f  the task is performed with different experimental 
guidelines. 
Pilot  
1 
2 
3 
4 
TABLE II1.- TOUCHDOWN ERRORS FOR ALL LANDINGS 
Touchdown e r r o r ,  meters (feet+ 
+61 (+ZOO) 
+15 (+50) 
+46 (+150) 
+38 (+126) 
-21 (-70) 
-61 (-200) 
~~ 
-38 (-123) 
-14 (-46) 
-10 (-32) 
+8 (+25) 
+28 (+92) 
-6 (-21) 
-18 (-58) 
+I3 (+42) 
+14 (+47) 
+17 (+56) 
+5 (+17) 
+1 (+2) 
-25 (-82) 
-33 (-108) 
A 
-57 (-187) 
-26 (-86) 
-14 (-45) 
-6 (-20) 
~~ 
-12 (-39) 
~ 
0 (+I) 
-26 (-87) 
+4 (+13) 
+28 (+92) 
-10 (-32) 
+7 (+22) 
+8 (+26) 
+8 (+27) 
-2 (-8) 
t10 (+33) 
-9 (-31) 
-11 (-36) 
-1 (-2) 
0 (-1) 
-9 (-29) 
B 
-9 (-30) 
-39 (-127) 
-15 (-49) 
-18 (-58) 
+13 (+42) 
_____ 
-18 (-58) 
-8 (-27) 
-38 (-125) 
-4 (-13) 
0 ( 0 )  
-1 (-3) 
-1 (-3) 
0 (0) 
-1 (-2) 
+5 (+16) 
-26 (-85) 
~ 
-6 (-19) 
-14 (-46) 
-48 (-158) 
-14 (-45) 
-1 (-3) 
0 (+I) 
+10 (+33) 
-9 (-28) 
t19 (+61) 
+18 (+59) 
+19 (+62) 
+18 (+59) 
+13 (+42) 
+2 (+5) 
E 
+16 (+54) 
+10 (+32) 
-11 (-36) 
-30 (-99) 
-9 (-30) 
-31 (-103) 
-11 (-37) 
+12 (+40) 
-6 (-20) 
-20 (-66) 
-16 (-53) 
-6 (-19) 
-9 (-31) 
-26 (-86) 
-12 (-39) 
+2 (+6) 
+28 (+92) 
-39 (-128) 
+2 (+7) 
-9 (-29) 
F 
+61 (+ZOO) 
+9 (+30) 
0 ( 0 )  
-9 (-29) 
+22 (+71) 
- - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - 
+7 (+24) 
+6 (+19) 
+1 (+2) 
-46 (-151) 
-42 (-138) 
-4 (-13) 
-10 (-32) 
-20 (-66) 
-3 (-11) 
-10 (-34) 
3u(2) 
-37 (-120) 
-28 (-91) 
-51 (-166) 
-40 (-132) 
-33 (-108) 
-9 (-28) 
-42 (-139) 
-8 (-27) 
+7 (+23) 
-12 (-39) 
- 
+6 (+21) 
+6 (+21) 
0 (+I) 
+7 (+22) 
t13 (+42) 
+5 (+17) 
+5 (+17) 
-7 (-24) 
-5 (-18) 
+4 (+E) 
'+ denotes long, - denotes shor t  of desired mark;  measured in  feet. 
3U(2) denotes final flight with unrestricted field of view. 
U(1) denotes initial flight with unrestricted field of view. 
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0 Pilot 1 1 2 5 0  
1 2 0 0  
0 Pilot 2 
A Pilot 3 
Landing number 
Figure 5.- All touchdown errors as  a function of landing number for each pilot. x = -7.3 meters (24 feet). 
Pilot Comments 
Other than touchdown er ror ,  which was  measured quantitatively, effects of reduced 
field of view were evaluated qualitatively by the subject pilots. Their comments y e  
included in the following two sections. 
power on and 360° power off) are  combined because of the similarity of the observa- 
tions for all circling approaches. 
Comments on the circling approaches (180 
180" and 360" approaches.- Even the least restrictive field of view, A,  compro- 
mised collision-avoidance capability. It also caused the runway to be out of sight for 
some portion of the circling (180" and 360') approaches, which forced the pilot to fly 
this portion of the pattern by reference to geographic landmarks (fig. 2(a)) and the air- 
craft altimeter. 
At  field of view B and other more restricted fields of view during the 180' approach, 
the references defining the touchdown point (a runway marker on one side of the runway 
and a vehicle parked on the other side) disappeared from sight during the final approach 
appreciably before touchdown. Thus, the pilot had to acquire another target for touch- 
down. Three of the pilots determined which dash of the dashed runway centerline was 
at the touchdown point and aimed for it after the prescribed touchdown references had 
disappeared from sight. 
of his touchdown er ror  at the lower fields of view to loss of sight of the touchdown 
targets. 
Pilot 1 did not develop this technique and ascribed a portion 
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At field of view B the first difficulty arose in establishing a high-key position for 
the 360' approach. High key is normally established by flying toward the runway until 
it disappears under the nose of the aircraft, at which time short periods of banked flight 
a re  used to obtain visual contact with the runway through the side canopy. A s  side 
vision was restricted, the use of banked flight for maintaining sight of the runway 
became ineffective farther from the overhead position. The distance from the high key 
at which banked flight was rendered ineffective became significant at field of view B. 
From this point, the pilot had to estimate the time required to fly to high key and begin 
his approach at this estimated position. 
A s  the experiment progressed, various piloting techniques for reducing touchdown 
er ror  at the expense of other parameters were observed. All the pilots eventually 
resorted to long, exaggeratedly shallow approaches which allowed them to arrive over 
the runway threshold at the minimum safe altitude. This altitude of 1 to 2 feet was then 
maintained, to the best of the pilot's ability under the experiment conditions, until the 
aircraft was over the desired touchdown point. At this point, most pilots "dumped" 
the aircraft onto the runway by releasing back pressure on the stick, knowing that the 
rate of sink incurred would not be disastrous. One pilot used a variation of the 
'?dumping" technique in which he cycled the ailerons rather violently, thus killing l i f t  
and increasing drag to accomplish touchdown at the desired spot without regard for rate 
of sink. 
It was at field of view C that shallowing of the approach and "dumping" the aircraft 
when over the desired touchdown point became obvious. Smoothness of longitudinal 
control also began to deteriorate as a result of the loss of perception of deviation from 
the desired glide path until large e r rors  existed. Large corrections were then made, 
and smoothness of control diminished. Also at field of view C,  banked flight for high- 
key determination during the 360' approach was useless. Once the landing runway 
disappeared from sight under the nose of the aircraft, it was not reacquired until the 
last few degrees of the final turn. Successful overhead approaches were performed, 
but the pilot acknowledged that a certain amount of luck was involved in properly esti- 
mating the time required to fly from the point at which visual contact with the runway 
was lost to the high-key position. Some loss of perception of glide-path angle occurred 
on the final approach, similar to that experienced during 180" power-on approaches, 
At field of view D, it was no longer possible to acquire sight of the runway during 
the final turn of the 180' approach. Therefore, the first glimpse of the runway was on 
final approach, which caused the runway centerline to be consistently overshot or under- 
shot. Loss of glide-path and sink-rate perception became more acute than with field of 
view C. 
A successful 360' overhead approach was accomplished at field of view D by the 
pilot who had performed the overhead approaches at field of view C. No further loss 
of visual contact with the landing runway during the approach was incurred by this 
reduction of the field of view, except for  a slightly later reacquisition of the runway at 
the end of the final turn. Since it was obvious that further reduction of field of view 
would not have resulted in appreciable further loss of sight of the runway during over- 
head approaches, none were performed at fields of view smaller than D. Some further 
loss of perception of glide-path angle on the final approach occurred at field of view D. 
This inadequacy undoubtedly would have been amplified had power-off approaches been 
performed at smaller fields of view. 
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At field of view E, the runway disappeared from sight on the final leg of the 180' 
approach during small heading corrections. This was annoying to the pilots, but they 
did not consider it to be a serious problem. Loss of glide-path and sink-rate perception 
became more acute than with field of view D. 
At  field of view F, the width of the 
opening in the windshield was narrower 
than the pilots' interpupillary distance , 
which caused the loss of binocular vision 
illustrated in figures 6(a) and 6@). The 
right eye and the left eye saw different 
parts of the outside world, with a blank 
area between. Three pilots reported 
that they ignored the information gath- 
ered by one eye and effectively flew 
with the use of the other eye. One pilot 
reported that he closed his left eye and 
used only his right eye. 
Although the smoothness of longitu- 
dinal control deteriorated progressively 
with fields of view below C, there was 
no loss of precision in the control of 
bank angle, heading, or  position over 
the runway centerline. Also, at no 
time was the safety pilot required to 
take control of the aircraft or  to abort 
a landing. 
Straight-in approaches .- Successful 
straight--&power-off approaches were 
performed at fields of view A, B, C,  
and D. Pilot performance was not ad- 
versely affected by the restriction of 
field of view except for slight loss of 
perception of proper glide-path angle 
at the smaller fields of view similar to 
that experienced on final approach 
during 180' power-on and 360' overhead 
approaches. 
Analysis of Touchdown Error  Data 
Inasmuch as touchdown e r ro r  X 
was used to measure the quality of the 
(a) Angle of binocular vision. 
EL Eyes 
(b) Effect of s l i t  narrower than interpupillary distance. 
Not drawn to scale .  
Figure 6.- Field of vision. 
performance of the task, a statistical analysis was conducted on mean touchdown e r ro r  x and then mean absolute touchdown e r ro r  IXI. The hypothesis that all values of 
and all values of were  equal, regardless of field of view, was  tested with a t-test, 
with the level of significance at 0.05 (see appendix). These data were analyzed indiuid- 
ually for each pilot. 
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The mean absolute values were not significantly different for any dombination of 
restricted cases for each pilot; however, there were  a few combinations for which the 
mean values were significantly different. 
ted case was not significantly different from the mean of the first unrestricted case. 
Also, for each subject the means for the first and the last unrestricted cases were not 
s ignific ant1 y different . 
For each subject, the mean for each restric- 
Figure 7 shows mean absolute touchdown e r ro r  at each field of view by the sequence 
in which flown, and table I1 gives the fields of view in the order flown by each pilot. 
m 
IE 
c, 
a, 
a, w 
0 2 4 6 8 
Flight sequence 
(a) Pilot 1 .  
m 
w 
a, 
IX 
2 4 6 8 
Flight sequence 
(b) Pilot 2. 
z 
a c, a, 
Flight sequence 
(c) Pilot 3. 
2 4 6 8 
Flight sequence 
(d) Pilot 4. 
Figure 7.- Mean absolute touchdown error by flight sequence. 
Figure 7 shows that there was no general trend toward lower mean absolute errors  that 
might be a result of "learning. " The touchdown errors  of all landings for each pilot 
were shown in figure 5. Had there been appreciable "learning," an overall convergence 
in the errors  from the first  to the fortieth landing would have been expected. Fig- 
ures 8(a) to 8(g) show touchdown er rors  versus landing number for each field of view. 
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6 0 -  
30 
m 
k 
Q) 
c1 
Landing Landing Landing 
(a) Unrestricted field of view. (b) Field of view A. (c) Field of view B.  
- 200 
- 150 
- 100 
- 
0 Pilot 1 
0 Pilot 2 
A Pilot 3 
0 Pilot 4 
- 0 
r5 
0 
0 
- A 
o o o & t A e  
0 
30 
Landing Landing Landing Landing 
(d) Field of view C.  (e) Field of view D. (f) Field of view E. (g) Field of view F 
-0 - 200 
- 150 
- 100 
- 
- - - - 
c-. w 
60 r - 
0 m 
k 
Q) 
Q) 
c1 
- 
000 
A 0  
0 
0 0 0 
A 
x" 
-30 -A A 0 
0 0 
Figure 8.- Touchdown error a s  a function of landing number for all pilots at each field of view. 
50 $ 
e, 
- - -100 
A A - -150 
0 
I I 1 9  I I I I I  I l I I I  
The absence of a convergence from the first to the fifth landing within the restricted 
fields of view and from the first to the tenth landing within the unrestricted field of view 
indicates that there was no appreciable "learning" within any particular field of view. 
The subject pilots flew without restriction of the field of view both before and after 
the sequence of restricted field of view flights. The mean touchdown error  &l standard 
deviation for each pilot is shown in figures 9(a) to 9(d). 
the start  than at the end of the sequence. There was also a reduction in mean absolute 
error  as well as scatter in the second unrestricted flight for each pilot (figs. 7 and 8). 
The statistical analysis performed indicated that these differences are not significant. 
The band, X &S, is wider at 
6orF Start Zd 200 100 c, Q) Q) w O vi +I IX 1 -100 
-60: I I I I I I I I I I U 
.25 .50 .75 1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75 2.00 2.25 2.50 Unrestricted 
Horizontal field of view, radians 
(a) Pilot 1. 
't 1 1 0 0  
; -20 
-4 0 
-60 0 .  L I I I I I I I I I J-200 5 , 50  .75 1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75 2.00 2.25 2.50 Unrestricted 
Horizontal field of view, radians 
(b) Pilot 2. 
Figure 9.- Mean touchdown error +I standard deviation a s  a function of 
field of view for each pilot. 
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m- 
$I -20 - 
IX 
-40 - 
(c) Pilot 3. 
w 
0 
m- 
-100 IX 
$I 
-60 
Horizontal field of view, radians 
(d) Pilot 4. 
I I I I I I I I - 
Figure 9.- Concluded. 
. : -20 
IX 
-40 
-60 
Suggestions for Future Research 
e, 
m 
+I 
w 
-100 IX 
- 
- 
I 1 I I I I I I - 
An evaluation of this experiment by the authors, subject pilots, and other cognizant 
persons indicates that it may be possible to improve future experiments of this type by 
considering the following suggestions : 
1. The ground rules for the subject pilots should be as strict as feasible, and the 
pilots should be instructed to follow these rules very closely. A more controlled exper- 
iment would thereby be realized. 
2. Rate of sink at touchdown, along with touchdown error, may be a more useful 
measure of a pilot’s performance of the task than touchdown er ror  alone. Qualitative 
ratings of overall performance by a nonsubject pilot may also be useful. 
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3. One pilot commented that split fields of view should be evaluated. He believes 
that 0.785 radian (45') of forward vision and the same amount of side vision would be 
more useful than a single 1.57 radian (90') field, regardless of the orientation of the 
latter field. It was also suggested that the experiment be repeated in a visual simula- 
tor in order to determine if  field of view has the same effect in a simulator as in flight. 
A similar study performed in an aircraft with more stringent landing character- 
istics would amplify the findings of this program. Also, a similar study using an air- 
craft with a low lift-drag ratio could provide design information for lifting reentry 
vehicles, a category of aircraft likely to have a restricted field of view. 
CONCLUSIONS 
A flight investigation performed with a T-33 jet aircraft to investigate the effects 
of restricted fields of view on performance of the approach and landing maneuver by 
four research pilots led to the following conclusions: 
1. Pilots were able to complete a 180' power-on pattern and make successful 
landings in this aircraft with a restricted field of view down to and including 0.10 radian 
(5.7') horizontal and 0.52 radian (30') vertical. 
2. Touchdown er ror  or  standard deviation did not vary significantly with field of 
view; however, pilot comments indicated that the task became increasingly difficult 
with decreasing field of view. 
3. Smoothness of longitudinal control decreased with decreasing field of view, but 
lateral and directional control were unaffected. 
Flight Research Center, 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 
Edwards, Calif. , January 20, 1967. 
125-19-06-03-24 
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APPENDIX 
ANALYSIS OF TOUCHDOWN-ERROR DATA 
The average touchdown er ror  x was calculated by using the expression 
The average absolute touchdown er ror  was calculated by using the expression 
Standard deviation S was calculated as follows: 
(Xi -X)2 
n - 1  S =  
where 
The latter expression was used in order to avoid squaring and adding small numbers. 
In a normal distribution, standard deviation S and average of absolute data ml 
are proportional; therefore, only X and were tested for significance. 
The data for each pilot, when considered as eight samples (seven for pilot 2) taken 
from the same distribution, satisfied a 99-percent confidence interval test. Thus the 
data are from the same population and can be represented by a normal distribution. 
A test of H : pi = pj for i = 1, - - , 7 and j = 2, , 8 was made for each 
pilot at all combinations of i and j for which j > i. Thus, each field of view was 
compared with every other field of view. It was assumed that the five landings at a 
particular field of view were unbiased, random samples from normal distributions 
and that the standard deviations were unknown and not necessarily equal. The test 
applied is described in reference 3. 
The criterion for rejection of H : pi = p .  was that It'l L to. 05/2;d, where J 
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Pi - Pj , with degrees of freedom d calculated by using the expression 
n. 
d =  - 2  
ni+ 1 + n e +  1 J 
The quantity Si2 was calculated as follows: 
The test was applied to determine significant differences at the 0.05 level between 
the means of all combinations of fields of view for the pilot. The absolute means were 
similarly checked. If there was no significant difference (H accepted) between the 
means of two fields of view, an = notation was entered on table IV. If there was a 
significant difference (H rejected), a # notation was entered. 
the intersection of row i and column j headed by the fields of view compared. 
The entry was made at 
TABLE IV.-RESULTS OF TESTS FOR INDICATED HYPOTHESES~ 
1 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
'ilc 
1 
2 
3 
4 
= denotes hypothesis accepted; # denotes hypothesis rejected. 
u(1) denotes initial 5 g h t  with unrestricted field of view. 
U(2) denotes final flight with unrestricted field of view. 
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. Because all entries in the table for absolute means are = notations, it was con- 
cluded that there was no significant difference between the fields of view when the 
amount of error  is considered without regard to whether the subject pilot was long o r  
short of the desired touchdown point. 
For means of touchdown error  there are some # signs in the table, but the 
following conclusions are  based on the locations of the = notations. For each subject 
pilot, there was no significant difference between the mean touchdown error  of any 
restricted field of view and the mean touchdown er ror  of the unrestricted field of view 
(U(1)) at the start of the program. The mean touchdown error  at the start of the program 
was not significantly different from the mean touchdown error  of the unrestricted case 
at the end of the program (U(2)). For example, for subject pilot 1, the mean of the dis- 
tribution of landings at field of view B is not significantly different from the mean of 
the distribution of landings at field of view F at the 0.05 level of significance. This is 
evidenced by the placement of an = notation at the intersection of row 3 and column 7, 
indicating that H: p3 = p7 was accepted at the 0.05 level. 
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